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INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the perceived effectiveness of the oldest and most 
famous citizens' crime commission in the United States--the Chicago Crime 
Commission.l The commission's effectiveness is measured by the perceptions of 
influential criminal justice decisionmakers and policymakers. 
The Chicago Crime Commission is a nonpartisan organization and it is 
privately funded by Fortune 500-type corporations in the Chicago area. The 
commission's reputation among criminal justice professionals is based largely 
on its efforts to combat organized crime. Its mission is to serve as a 
watchdog, monitoring the criminal justice system to detect and deter 
corruption and to promote efficiency in agency operations. 
Perceptual Data and Evaluation Research 
The justification for using perceptual data in assessing effectiveness is 
related to the Chicago Crime Commission's low-visibility approach to changing 
the criminal justice system. The commission prefers negotiation to public 
confrontation. Many of the commission's attempts to influence criminal 
justice policy are known only to three groups: (1) members of the board of 
directors, who provide funding and set goals for the commission; (2) 
professional staff (e.g., the executive director) who manage the organization; 
and (3) criminal justice decisionmakers and policymakers who are the targets 
of many of the commission's activities. 
In this study, we focus only on the perceptions of criminal justice 
decisionmakers and policymakers. We are currently conducting another research 
project to determine whether the commission's board of directors and 
professional staff hold different perceptions of the commission's 
effectiveness than criminal justice decisionmakers and policymakers. 
1 
Exploratory Propositions 
Two exploratory propositions are examined in this research. 
H1 Various decisionmakers 
administrators, judges, 
different perceptions of 
and policymakers (e.g., police 
prosecutors, and lawmakers) hold 
the comrrdssion's effectiveness. 
Hz Decisionmakers and policymakers who perceive the commission 
as legitimate are more likely to perceive it as effective. 
The first proposition relates to the long-standing sociological conception 
that differences in the social location of groups make for differences in 
interests and values. These differences involve variations in perceptions and 
perspectives among groups (Merton, 1972). Applying this theoretical 
expression to criminal justice, we assumed that decisionmakers and 
policymakers from various agencies, who operate at various levels of 
government and address diverse organizational goals, have divergent 
perceptions uf the commission's effectiveness. 
The second propositi on is based on legitimacy theory--explaining 
individuals' acceptance of a policy or the institution making the demand as a 
function of the institution's authority and role in governance (Bickel, 1962; 
Black, 1960; and Patrick, 1968). Legitimation is the right of an organization 
to operate in a particular field or domain (Warren, 1983). 
In this study, we ask whether the Chicago Crime Commission is legitimated 
to carry on activities within the official justice system. We also ask 
whether decisionmakers and poli cymakers regard the commission as insiders or 
outsiders in the criminal justice system. Insiders have privileged access to 
a system, while outsiders are excluded from it (Merton, 1972). 
Our initial hunch was that the Chicago Crime Commission, a private sector 
organization, was viewed as an outsider by criminal justice professionals. 
Empirical support for this intuitive notion is contained in a survey of the 
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administrators of community-based correctional programs in a midwestern city 
(Wakefield and Webb, 1979). The researchers discovered that administrators of 
government agencies do not perceive nongovernmental organizations to be part 
of the justice system. 
Organizational theorists, such as Price (1968), claim that organizations 
with legitimacy are more likely to be perceived as effective than 
organizations that lack legitimacy, As Warren, Rose, and Bergunder (1974) 
point out, the power that community organizations are able to exercise in 
influencing activities within their functional fields "is not simply a product 
of the power positions of their boards, the backing of the mayor and the 
financial and personnel resources at their command .•. important as these 
components are. For these components of power, as well as others, are in turn 
rooted in the legitimation of the individual community decision organizations 
within the interorganizational field .. , " (p. 25). 
SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
Data were gathered through interviews with decisionmakers and policymakers 
in a three-stage research strategy, The first stage involved obtaining the 
following list of decisionmakers whom the commission tries to influence from 
the executive director of the crime commission: the Cook County State's 
Attorney, the Cook County Sheriff, the Chief Judge of the Cook County Circuit 
Court, the Chief Judge of the Criminal Division of the Cook County Circuit 
Court, the Chief Probation Officer of the Cook County Adult Probation 
Department, and the Deputy Superintendent of the Bureau of Technical Services 
of the Chicago Police Department. 
The second stage consisted of interviewing these decisionmakers. We 
conducted five personal interviews and one telephone interview. Interviewees 
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were asked to provide the names of other high-ranking officials in their 
organization who were knowledgeable about the commission. 
Decisionmakers named through this snowball sampling procedure were 
interviewed during the third phase of the project. This group included the 
First Deputy Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, the Chief of the 
Organized Crime Division of the Chicago Police Department, the Administrative 
Assistant to the Mayor of Chicago, and two judges of the Criminal Division of 
the Cook County Circuit Court. These individuals were asked the same 
questions as the first group. All of the referrals except one were 
interviewed by telephone. 
Poli cymakers in the Illinois state legislature were asked the same 
questions as decisionmakers in the Chicago criminal justice system. The 
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House supplied the names of 
several legislators whom they deemed to be influential on criminal justice 
issues. These legislators were interviewed and asked for referrals. Two of 
the interviewees were members of the House Criminal Law Committee, one was a 
member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the other individual was a 
powerful leader in the Senate. 
Policymakers were included, although the crime commission did not identify 
the state legislature as an institution over which it exerted influence on a 
regular basis. Justifications for including state legislators are twofold. 
First, the Chicago Crime Commission expended considerable resources from 1983 
through 1984 to defeat bills aimed at legalizing gambling and to sponsor four 
organized crime bills. Second, state legislators were included because the 
ability to shape criminal law seems to be a sine qua non of any community 
organization with the goal of changing and improving criminal justice. 
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Questions posed to decisionmakers and policymakers probed the area of 
perceived effectiveness. Respondents rated the commission on the following 
criteria: (1) maintaining political autonomy or independence; (2) developing 
useful proposals about how to improve the justice system; (3) having 
sufficient power to have its proposals adopted; (4) monitoring criminal 
justice agencies; (5) conducting policy research; (6) influencing criminal 
justice policies and practices; (7) sponsoring and operating programs that 
reduce crime; (8) being tied into neighborhood organizations; and (9) 
maintaining liaison with criminal justice agencies.2 Respondents were asked 
open-ended questions relating to the perceived legitimacy of the commission. 
Decisionmakers and policymakers were also asked general questions about the 
value or utility of the commission. 
The responses of decisionmakers and policymakers could have been affected 
by their awareness that their answers would reflect directly on their 
political institutions and agencies and on their interorganizational relations 
with the crime commission. We could not eliminate the professional courtesy 
effect, that is, the reluctance of members of a system to criticize other 
members of the system. Our strategy was to interview as many decisionmakers 
and policymakers as possible and to challenge the few respondents we suspected 
of puffery, that is, we asked them to explain why their answers diverged so 
much from the answers of other respondents. Sixteen individuals were 
interviewed. 
PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS: RATINGS OF THE CHICAGO CRIME COMMISSION 
BY DECISIONMAKERS AND POLICYMAKERS 
Data concerning the perceived effectiveness of the crime commission were 
analyzed. Aggregate data are presented first, and then disaggregated data are 
analyzed to examine similarities and differences in the ratings of 
decisionmakers and policymakers. 
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Perceived Strengths and Weaknesses 
A general idea of the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the crime 
commission can be gained by examining the aggregate data. Table 1 shows the 
weighted mean score for each criterion of effectiveness. 
Table 1 




(5) (4) (3) ( 2) (l) Weighted 
Effectiveness Very Don't Mean 
Criteria Excellent Good Good Fair Poor Know Score 
Political Autonomy 4 8 3 0 0 0 4.06 
Liaison 3 4 6 0 0 2 3.76 
Monitoring 1 3 8 2 0 1 3.21 
Programs 1 3 4 3 0 4 3.18 
Policy Research 1 3 5 3 0 3 3.16 
Useful Proposals 1 4 5 4 1 0 2.93 
Impact 1 3 5 5 1 0 2.86 
Ties to Neighborhood 
Organizations I 1 1 5 1 2 5 2.80 Power 0 1 7 6 1 0 2.53 
Political autonomy was the highest rated area, receiving a mean score of 
4.06 on a 5.00 scale. The commission also received high ratings for 
maintaining liaison with criminal justice agencies (3.76), monitoring criminal 
justice agencies (3.21), operating programs that reduce crime (3.18), and 
conducting policy research (3.16). 
Lower ratings were assigned to the commission for developing useful 
proposals (2.93), having an impact on criminal justice policies and practices 
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(2.86), ties to neighborhood organizations (2.80), and possessing sufficient 
power to have its proposals adopted (2.53). 
Similarities and Differences in the Ratings of Decisionmakers and Policymakers 
Table 2 displays the ratings for each effectiveness criterion by level of 
government and department. In general, the rank order of the criteria is the 
same for the disaggregated data. Regardless of level of government or 
department, decisionmakers and policymakers tended to give the highest ratings 
to political autonomy, liaison, monitoring, programs, and policy research. By 
contrast, lower ratings were assigned to power, impact, useful proposals, and 
ties to neighborhood organizations. 
Especially noteworthy is the high degree of similarity in the overall 
ratings of decisionmakers in city and county criminal justice agencies. The 
overall ratings were: chief probation officer 3.63, sheriff 3.33, state's 
attorney 4 .33, administrative assistant to the mayor 3.33, judges' mean score 
3.28, and police administrators' mean score 3.70. 
Ratings by state legislators differed substantially from those of 
decisionmakers in city and county agencies. 
legislators was 2.49. 
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The mean score for state 
Table 2 
RaTings of The Perceived Effectiveness of the Chicago Crime Commission by Decisionmakers and Pol icymakers (N=16) 
Level of Government/Official Position I Effectiveness Criteria 
or Office 
I 
Ties to Composite Group 
Political Useful Pol icy Neighborhood Mean Mean 
Autonomy Proposals Power Monitoring Research Impact Programs Organizations Liaison Score Score 
Rati nH I 
Cook County: 
Adult Probation Department--
Chief Probation Officer 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 OK 4 3.63 MD 
Circuit Court--
Chief Judge 5 3 3 3 OK 3 3 3 3 3.25 MD 
Chief Judge, Criminal Division 3 2 2 3 2 2 5 3 3 2.78 MD 
Judge, Criminal Division 4 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 5 3.44 MD 
Judge, Criminal Division 4 2 2 3 OK 2 DK OK 3 2.67 MD 
Judges' Mean Score 4.00 2.75 2.50 3.00 3.50 2.75 3.00 3.33 4.67 MD 3.28 
Sheriff's Office--
Sheriff I 5 4 3 4 4 3 2 2 3 3.33 MD "' State Attorney's Office--State's Attorney 5 5 3 4 3 5 4 5 5 4.33 MD 
City of Chicago: 
Pol ice Department--
Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of 
Technical Services 4 4 2 3 4 4 3 3 5 3.56 MD 
Chief of o.c. Division 4 3 3 5 2 4 4 3 4 3.56 MD 
First DepuTy Superintendent 5 4 3 4 5 3 2 3 4 3.66 MD 
Police Administrators' Mean Score 4.33 3.66 2.66 4.00 3.66 3.66 4.00 3.00 4.33 MD 3.70 
Mayor's Office: 
Administrative Assistant to Mayor 5 3 4 4 4 3 2 I 4 3.33 MD 
State of Illinois: 
House--
(0) Member, Criminal Law Committee 4 I I 2 3 I OK OK 3 2.14 MD 
(R) Member, Criminal Law Committee 3 2 2 OK OK 2 DK I DK 1.67 MD 
Member, Criminal Law Committee 4 3 3 3 4 3 OK 3 4 3.37 MD 
Senate--
(0) Anonymous senator 4 4 2 3 3 2 3 DK 3 3.00 MD 
(R) Member, Judiciary Committee 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 DK DK MD MD 
Legislators' Mean Score 3.60 2.40 2.00 2.00 2.66 2.00 2.50 2.00 3.33 MD 2.49 
1Numbers represent the following rating scale: excellent, 5; very good, 4; good, 3; fair, 2; poor, 1; OK, do not know; and MD, missing data. 
PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY: THE CRIME COMMISSION 
AS BOTH AN INSIDER AND AN OUTSIDER 
Differences in perceptions of the commission's legitimacy may account for 
some of the variation in the perception of effectiveness held by state 
legislators and local criminal justice officials. 
The View From Chicago: The Crime Commission as Part of the Unofficial Justice 
System 
To what degree do the decisionmakers' perceptions about the commission 1 s 
legitimacy parallel their perceptions about the commission's effectiveness? 
Qualitative data indicate that nearly all of the criminal justice 
decisionmakers from city and county agencies agreed that the crime commission 
was not part of the official justice system. At the same time, however, many 
interviewees implied strongly that the crime commission was part of the 
unofficial justice system in Chicago. 
Part of the perceived role of the commission in the unofficial system is 
to provide information regarding citizens' views and concerns about criminal 
justice problems. This includes pressuring official decisionmakers to do 
something about the issues that citizens perceive as problematic (e.g., 
prostitutes solid ting customers in residential neighborhoods and organized 
crime). 
The question of whether the commission is a true insider hinges on whether 
it has direct access to information and decisionmakers. Several 
decisionmakers indicated that the crime commission enjoys a high degree of 
access to the system in Chicago. 
Within the police department, the Deputy Superintendent of the Bureau of 
Technical Services reported that the Chicago Crime Commission has hands-on 
involvement in criminal justice administration. He said that the commission, 
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through its Report Crime Program,3 supplies the police department with 
valuable information. The department, in turn, shares arrest statistics and 
otber data with the commission. 
The Chief Judge, Criminal Division, Cook County Circuit Court, stated that 
he makes court statistics available to the executive director of the 
commission. Moreover, he admitted providing the executive director with 
information on court administration problems that is not given to the media or 
anyone outside the court system. 
The Cook County State's Attorney indicated a similar situation, when he 
said, "Anything Pat (the executive director) wants from us, he gets." Similar 
statements were made by the Cook County Sheriff, the Chief Probation Officer 
of Cook County, and the Administrative Assistant to the Mayor. 
This suggests that the commission has formal and informal access to 
official decisionmakers in the justice system. Few other community 
organizations in Chicago have the same degree of access to the system, to use 
its information, and to make face-to-face recommendations to administrators. 
The View from Springfield: The Crime Commission as an Outsider 
Policymakers from the Illinois legislature in Springfield, Illinois, gave 
the commission much lower ratings on both effectiveness and legitimacy than 
decisionmakers from criminal justice agencies in Chicago. Most of the 
policymakers do not consider the commission to be part of the criminal justice 
system. They view the commission as playing an advisory role outside the 
system and raising the awareness of public and elected officials about 
organized crime and criminal justice problems. 
Most of the legislators who were interviewed indicated that they thought 
the commission was not only outside the legislative system but also out of 
touch with the realities of legislative politics. Some lawmakers felt the 
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commission's organized crime bills were "too heavy handed," given the 
substantial representation of former defense lawyers on key committees. More 
specifically, a legislator complained that the commission's proposal to allow 
state officials to eavesdrop on a telephone conversation without the consent 
of one of the parties was regarded by many legislators as violating 
individuals' rights. 
Other lawmakers criticized the commission for lacking sophistication in 
legislative politics. According to one legislator, the commission sometimes 
releases its position paper on an issue after the bill has been introduced, 
which is "too late in the game. Another lawmaker noted that commission 
representatives do not monitor closely enough legislative proposals related to 
criminal justice to be informed participants in the legislative process. 
Another legislator asserted that commission representatives do not fully 
appreciate the political meaning attached to certain pieces of legislation, 
such as the commission's statewide grand jury bill. In this legislator's 
view, many lawmakers opposed the idea of a statewide grand jury because they 
feared it would broaden the power of the state's attorneys and they might 
abuse the power. Finally, one legislator offered what seems to be a partial 
explanation of these perceived deficiencies. He thought that because the 
crime commission did not have a professional lobbyist in Springfield, it was 
unable to participate in the informal "wheeling, dealing, and compromising" 
that constitutes the routine way of getting things accomplished in the 
legislature. 
It should come as no surprise that lawmakers perceive relations between 
the legislature and the crime commission to be practically nonexistent. Yet, 
many legislators said they would be available to the board and the executive 
director if the commission representatives took the time to contact them. 
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Several legislators commented that informal access to legislators would be 
easier for crime commission board members than for average citizens because of 
the high socioeconomic status of board members. Most of the legislators 
indicated that board members would have to get more involved in lobbying 
efforts to get proposed legislation passed. 
One senator noted that the commission finds itself in a dilemma regarding 
lobbying. The commission may get more bills passed in the short run if 
members use their political connections and personal contacts more than they 
have in the past. But, too much lobbying may compromise the commission's 
political autonomy, thus potentially reducing the commission's effectiveness 
in the long run. 
TENTATIVE, UNANTICIPATED FINDINGS 
Two tentative, unanticipated findings emerged from the qualitative data: 
( 1) perceptions of the commission's effectiveness seem to be related to 
whether criminal justice decisionmakers and policymakers can use the 
commission for their purposes, and (2) the commission's perceived association 
with the business elite and the perceived effectiveness of the executive 
director appear to influence the kind of evaluations the commission receives 
on effectiveness. 
Perceived Utility 
Legislators, who as a group gave the commission lower ratings on the 
effectiveness criteria, reported that the commission was useful to them in 
only one way. Four legislators stated that the commission's policy research 
papers on topics such as organized crime and off-track betting provided 
valuable information and raised their awareness of these issues. 
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By contrast, decisionmakers in city and county criminal justice agencies, 
who gave the commission higher ratings on effectiveness, indicated that the 
commission was useful to them in a variety of ways. First, the commission 
serves as a bridge between the private and public sectors. The Deputy 
Superintendent, Bureau of Technical Services, Chicago Police Department, 
stated that the crime commission identifies public administrators' problems 
and then uses private sector resources to solve them .. For example, the 
commission provided the police department with bank loan officers and computer 
experts to advise the department on acquiring computers. 
Second, some criminal justice administrators use the commission as a 
stalking horse. The same deputy superintendent revealed that sometimes it is 
useful to have the commission argue with city officials for more space or 
staff for the police department because of the commission's independent, 
nonpartisan, public-interest reputation. 
Third, the commission serves as a sounding board for citizens concerns and 
complaints. Through the commission's Report Crime Program decisionmakers 
obtain information about public attitudes and preferences. A judge in the 
Criminal Division of the Cook County Circuit Court recalled that in 1984, the 
commission discovered through Report Crime that citizens in several 
neighborhoods were upset about prostitutes soliciting for customers in 
residential areas. The commission investigated the situation and then 
criticized the judges for not sentencing repeat-offender prostitutes to jail 
to get them off the streets. According to the judge, if the commission had 
not taken action, the court would not have known that the community perceived 
this to be such a serious problem. 
Fourth, the commission is a tool for criminal justice reform. The Chief 
Probation Officer of Cook County explained how he used the commission to 
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increase professionalism in his department. According to him, the probation 
department operated inefficiently and sometimes hired personnel on the basis 
of patronage prior to 1980. In his words, "it needed to be changed." The 
crime commission prepared a highly critical evaluation of the department which 
provided the factual documentation and the "third-party support" that he 
needed to make changes in areas such as personnel hiring practices, 
classification of offenders, and case management. 
Fifth, some administrators use evaluative information collected through 
the commission's monitoring activities as a management tool. The Chief Judge 
of the Cook County Circuit Court credited the commission's judicial 
performance evaluations with providing meaningful, objective, unbiased 
information on the behavior of judges under his supervision. The same judge 
also stressed that the commission assisted the court by identifying old cases 
in which numerous continuances were granted. The Cook County State's Attorney 
agreed with the judge, stating that the commission's list of old cases made 
prosecutors more sensitive to the problems of the lack of celerity in 
processing cases. 
Sixth, the commission provides information on crime and criminals. The 
Chief of the Chicago Police Department's Organized Crime Unit reported using 
the commission's information on gangs and individuals suspected of having ties 
to organized crime. 
Elite Sponsorship, Leadership of the Commission, and Effectiveness 
Findings on elite sponsorship, leadership of the commission, and 
effectiveness are based on unsystematic, anecdotal evidence. Although we are 
uncertain about the degree of confidence to place in these findings, they are 
presented to give a more complete picture of factors that may be related to 
the commission's perceived effectiveness. 
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The explanations that some policymakers and decisionmakers gave for their 
evaluations provide insight into the reasons behind the ratings of 
effectiveness. For example, the Cook County Sheriff rated the commission high 
on effectiveness criteria because of the board members' high social status and 
the dedi cation and fairness of the executive director. The First Deputy 
Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department also pointed out that his high 
ratings of the commission reflected his positive evaluation of the executive 
director. The first deputy praised the executive director for his 
"constructive criticism" and for his willngness to listen to viewpoints with 
which he disagrees. One lawmaker, who gave the commission high ratings on all 
effectiveness criteria, said that he gave the commission 1 s recommendations 
special consideration because of the makeup of the board of directors and 
because of his respect for the executive director. 
These findings suggest the possibility of a halo effect, wherein some 
assessments of effectiveness may have little relationship to real or objective 
effectiveness. Instead, some evaluations may reflect the decisionmakers and 
the policymakers opinions of the commission members rather than the 
effectiveness of their actions, i.e., the business elite and an esteemed 
executive director rather than the commission's accomplishments. 
DISCUSSION 
High-level decisionmakers in the Chicago criminal justice system and state 
lawmakers disagree about the effectiveness of the Chicago Grime Commission. 
Our findings suggest that perceived legitimacy is an important factor in 
accounting for the similarity of ratings by local decisionmakers and the 
difference between ratings by state and local authorities. Whether the 
commission is regarded as an insider or an outsider seems to make a difference 
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in dec.isionmakers and policymakers perceptions of effectiveness. Perceived 
utility, although not predicted to be a factor initially seemed to account for 
some variation in ratings of effectiveness. 
Exchange Relations, Community Politics, and Organizational Domains 
Relating our findings to exchange relations, community politics, and 
organizational domains may explain how the commission's linkages with 
personnel in the local justice system affect the perceived effectiveness of 
the commission within the system. Research on the criminal justice system in 
Chicago indicates that it is integrated by machine politics. City and county 
agencies comprise a relatively coordinated and unified system (Jacob, 1980; 
Ruchelman, 1974). 
If the system is unified, decisionmakers within the system could be 
expected to hold similar views about which groups are inside the system and 
which groups are outside the system, which groups are legitimate and which are 
not, and so forth. The substantial convergence in the ratings of the 
commission's effectiveness by local decisionmakers is consistent with this 
post hoc explanation. 
Clearly, the commission is tied to local criminal justice agencies through 
exchange relations. The commission is dependent on the decisionrnakers for 
access to information about administrative problems, and decisionmakers use 
the commission in a variety of ways. State legislators may not be part of 
this system or network of relations. While there may be overlap between the 
local justice system and the legislature, it is plausible that individuals are 
perceived as insiders in one system and outsiders in another system. 
seems to be the case with the crime commission. 
This 
A key issue is how the members of in each system define effectiveness.4 
Within their policy-oriented domain, state legislators measure success by who 
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wins and who loses conflicts over specific bills. Furthermore, lawmakers 
follow certain norms in going about the business of negotiating, bargaining, 
and voting. 
The commission receives low ratings using this criteria because of its 
defeat on organized crime bills and its perceived violations of some norms of 
legislative behavior (e.g., enter the process too late and introduce bills 
that carry excessive political baggage). 
By contrast, the commission receives high ratings when it is evaluated 
using local justice agencies' standards of success. Within this management-
oriented domain, effectiveness means rationalizing the system to make it more 
cost-efficient and cost-effective. Apparently, the commission has been very 
successful in this regard. 
In summary, the crime commission suffers from the Rashomon Effect (Schon, 
1971). This phenomena occurs when individuals occupying roles in various 
domains view an organization from various vantage points, use various measures 
of effectiveness, and have different perceptions of reality. 
Legislative Change Versus Administrative Change/Realistic Change Versus 
Fundamental Change 
Thinking about the perceived effectiveness of the commission in a critical 
way leads to a consideration of the kinds of change that the commission has 
and has not produced in the criminal justice system. Distinctions can be 
drawn between legislative versus administrative changes and between realistic 
versus fundamental changes. 
Constraints built into the crime commission's raison d'entre seem to limit 
its potential for effecting legislative change. It is conceivable that the 
commission could enhance state legislators' perceptions of its effectiveness 
by becoming more involved in the legislative process. But, what kinds of 
favors or political trade-offs would the commission have to offer, and what 
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would be the likely consequences if the commission became more involved in the 
legislative process? Board members could use their socioeconomic status and 
economic resources to gain more political clout for the commission. However, 
this would endanger the commission's political independence, an important 
reason for the commission's perceived effectiveness within the local criminal 
justice system. 
Decisionmakers regard the commission as being useful in producing 
realistic change rather than fundamental change. This study reveals that the 
commission is perceived as being effective in bringing about administrative 
changes within various local agencies. Presumably, criminal justice agencies 
in Chicago operate more efficiently today because of commission-supported 
alterations in organizational procedures and resources generated as a result 
of the commission's lobbying. 
Data presented in this study lead to the conclusion that the commission is 
very effective in doing what local decisionmakers want it to do, i.e., 
assisting in administrative change. What this study does not address, 
however, is how effective the commission has been in reducing the crime rate 
or in producing a more just criminal justice system. These concerns relate to 
fundamental change. 
To study the commission and fundamental change would require collecting 
perceptual information from a different set of individuals. For example, the 
heads of community organizations with a liberal bias (e.g., the American Civil 
Liberties Union) may perceive the crime commission as being more of a lapdog 
than a watchdog. That is, they may contend that the administrative changes 
for which decisionmakers credit the commission do not constitute real changes 
or major accomplishments. 
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NOTES 
l. A large void exists in the criminal justice literature regarding citizens 
crime commissions. More is known about citizens crime commissions that 
operated during the first part of the twentieth century than is known 
about current commissions. Virgil W. Peterson (1945), a former Operating 
Director of the Chicago Crime Commission, has written an interesting 
historical account of the early crime commissions. Other scholars 
(Haller, 1970, 1971; Goldberg, 1940; and Morse and Moley, 1929) examined 
the origins and the early years of the Chicago Crime Commission. Yet, 
only two empirical studies have been concerned with modern crime 
commissions. Hoffman (1986) analyzed the Chicago Crime Commission's 
response to organized crime in 1980-84. Webb and Hoffman's (1985) 
national survey of citizens crime commissions was the first comprehensive 
study of all private crime commissions since Peterson's work. 
2. These criteria were selected based on the authors' previous research on 
the Chicago Crime Commission and citizens crime commissions in the United 
States (Webb and Hoffman, 1985; Hoffman, 1986). 
3. The Report Crime Program, operated 
handles telephone reports of criminal 
remain anonymous. The commission 
enforcement agencies. 
by the Chicago Crime Commission, 
activity from citizens who prefer to 
forwards these reports to law 
4. This interpretation is based on Kouzes and Mico's (1979) domain theory. 
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